More information on “Bastion-P” Matua Island deployment


  • Deployment day is now known
  • Maxar and Sentinel capture deployment
  • Identity of ships involved now known

Following on from my previous blog on the deployment of Russian K-300P “Bastion-P” mobile coastal defence missile unit to Matua Island, further satellite imagery from Sentinel and Maxar has been found showing the deployment taking place.

Moreover, the Maxar imagey has captured the actual moment the equipment exits the Pacific Fleet Project 775M Ropucha class Large landing ship – and in such detail you can clearly see the personnel filming the event.

The first thing ascertained is that the deployment took place on November 16th 2021, so the Russian MoD took two weeks to release the news. It is also now confirmed that all the support vehicles and personnel deployed at the same time rather than at an earlier date – which I suggested may have been the case in the previous blog.

If you watched the video from the Russian MoD in my last blog, at the beginning of it a Monolit-B mobile coastal surveillance radar vehicle exits the Ropucha class landing ship. The Maxar image clearly shows the Monolit-B on the beach having passed the “film crew”, and a K-300P just exited the ship and still in the breakwater.

Satellite image ©2021 Maxar Technologies.

The Ropucha can also be clearly identified as Admiral Nevelsky [055].

Imagery of the base for November 16th – the same as that from the ROLES article mentioned in my previous blog – shows little going on so it is likely that a small group of personnel were already there to set up the base, but very little else. However, it is good to get a high resolution of the image now.

Satellite image ©2021 Maxar Technologies.

Of interest is just how lucky a capture this was. Going through Sentinel-2 imagery, the weather before the 16th, up to today (December 9th), has been cloudy for the vast majority of the time. This is the drawback to normal EO imagery, and is why the SAR imagery capabilities of Capella is important to modern intelligence gathering using satellite imagery.

The Capella image from the 3rd December was collected during a period of 100% cloud cover over the island.

There is absolutely no doubt that both capabilities work in tandem with each other and will make it exceptionally difficult to hide deployments such as these in the future. Capella can provide continuous coverage of a target of interest, and should full EO imagery be required for confirmation of activity and/or actual identities of ships etc. then this can be tasked by the likes of Maxar when weather permits.

The Sentinel-2 imagery, though of low resolution, also revealed the other ships used in the deployment. These consisted of:

  • Project 141 Kashtan class tender KIL-168
  • Project 23470 salvage tug Andrey Stepanov
  • Project 19910 AGS Viktor Faleev

S-AIS data from FleetMon for Andrey Stepanov shows that she arrived at the island on the 14th November, staying for the deployment. She then left the region back to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky on the 17th, before returning at the end of the month and arriving on the 27th via Severo-Kurilsk at the island of Paramushir.

A quick hop back to and from Severo-Kurilsk took place over a couple of days, and she is now enroute back to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky as we speak.

The FleetMon Sat 15 package was worth its weight in gold for recovering this data

With this activity from Andrey Stepanov and the timing of the Russian MoD news, can one presume that the deployment is now over and just lasted two weeks?

With the Capella imagery showing very little activity at the base on 3rd December, it may well be.

But, it could also be that Andrey Stepanov has been shuttling supplies back and forth to the island – though as a tug is more likely to be there in support of a further ship such as KIL-168. With no S-AIS data available for both KIL-168 and iktor Faleev it could be they were there also. The runway is operational and also capable of taking flights for supply purposes.

For the time being, some further monitoring of the island is required.

Russian K-300P “Bastion-P” deployment to Kuril Islands


  • Russian Mod News outlet shows K-300P deployment to Matua Island
  • Capella Space imagery collection request submitted for next available pass
  • Imagery from just over 26 hours later collected and analysed

The Russian Ministry of Defence produced a small video on 2nd December 2021 of a K-300P “Bastion-P” mobile coastal defence missile unit deploying to Matau Island – part of the disputed Kuril Island chain in the Pacific.

Though only just over 1 minute and 10 seconds long, a few things can be taken from it and analysed.

The original video on the Russian MoD site can be found here or alternatively it can found on the Zvezda news online website.

The video commences with a Monolit-B mobile coastal surveillance radar vehicle (mounted on a MZKT-7930 chassis) exiting a Pacific Fleet Project 775M Ropucha class Large landing ship onto one of the beaches of the island.

This is easily identifiable in Google Earth, located at 48° 2’49.30″N 153°13’13.19″E

The complete K-300P battery – consisting of 4 launcher vehicles (TELs) and two Monolit-B radar vehicles – are seen transiting south along the beach, probably to an access track at the far end that allows vehicles to proceed up onto the mainland.

From here the battery heads east to the airfield, along the northern edge of the runway, before heading north to what was an old scientific research base located at 48° 3’59.89″N 153°15’37.12″E

Google Earth imagery from September 2019 shows that the base had been modified from the previous 2016 imagery. This was the same as the runway and was carried out during research expeditions in 2016 and 2017.

Interestingly, the battery convoy doesn’t show any support vehicles, and it is highly likely these had already arrived prior to this part of the filming. Moreover, the video shows that the research area has been fully converted into a small military base made up of trailer buildings for accommodation and operations along with a separately fenced off communications area containing at least Satcom.

On the 22nd November 2021, the Japanese Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology (ROLES) produced a report saying the research base had been recently upgraded. Imagery in the report, from Maxar, showed that the base was still in the 2019 Google Earth configuration in September 2021, but by October it was well underway to becoming the new base.

Image from ROLES report. Original imagery from Maxar Technologies Secure watch

By November 16th it appeared to be complete, including two hangers that ROLES had measured at 30 metres in length. This is sufficient to take two K-300P TEL vehicles each – though it would be a tight squeeze.

Image from ROLES report. Original imagery from Maxar Technologies Secure watch

Please head to the ROLES website to view their report.

A short sequence shows inside what is probably one of the command vehicles though nothing of note is discernible. A keypad to the right of the screen states “INTERNAL COMMUNICATION” (ВНУТРЕННЯЯ СВЯЗЬ) used for secure coms between all the vehicles of the battery.

The remainder of the video shows two of the K-300P TELs (TEL 211 and TEL 214) taking a small tour of the South-eastern part of the island before deploying into two revetments back at the airfield.

48° 2’15.12″N 153°16’32.28″E

Capella Space Imagery

Whilst the news from the Russian MoD was interesting, it didn’t actually state any dates for when this deployment took place and whether it is still in operation. It had to be after October 23rd as the Maxar imagery in the ROLES report showed the base still under construction.

The Zvezda article had quotes from the Pacific Fleet: “On this remote island in the central part of the Kuril ridge, the Pacific Fleet’s missilemen will be on a 24-hour watch to monitor the adjacent water area and straits,” and “For the operation and maintenance of equipment, the equipment of technical posts has been installed, storage facilities for equipment and materiel have been deployed, entrances to the launch sites have been equipped,”

It also stated that work has been completed on the improvement of premises intended for year-round service and residence of personnel.

I wanted to check whether this was the case and so I put in an image collection request with Capella Space on the 2nd December 2021 at 1000 GMT.

From this request they were able to create a collection task for the 3rd December at 1236 GMT when the next pass took place – just 26 and a half hours later.

From comparing the video to revetment locations, it was a simple task to find where TEL 211 and 214 positioned themselves. This can also be easily done using Google Earth despite the age of the imagery available at this time. Very little has changed here except for the base.

However, the ability to task specific collection areas for future satellite passes meant an up-to-date 50cm resolution image was available for closer inspection.

Firstly, looking at the positions taken up by the TELs in the video these are now empty, though as a mobile system this is to be expected.

TEL 211 position

TEL 214 position

Main base

The main base does still show some sort of presence, though it is impossible to ascertain whether it is actually manned or not.

Whilst vehicles are present to the northeast of the hangers this doesn’t necessarily mean that they are being used. The Russian military store vehicles at locations for ease of a quick deployment should they decide to man them.

Though not shown here, the image available to me was for the complete southeastern area of the island and therefore all the areas commonly used when a deployment takes place. Again, there is little evidence to show any activity. There are no vehicles located at any of the revetments – likewise at the various locations to the north and south that could be used for not only the K-300Ps TELs but also any of the support vehicles carrying out any other tasks.

The concrete pad area is likely for supply storage, and this does appear to be empty.

However, with an +11 hour time difference between GMT and the region, this would mean that the local time when the collection took place was 2336 and therefore everything would probably be closed down for the night and little activity would be taking place anyway.

The fact that it was 2336, and therefore night time, highlights how useful the Capella SAR capability is. I was able to put in a request, and they were able to set up an image collection at the next available pass – despite it being dark. It could have been days before the next EO pass could be available from other providers.

This region is one of those that I regularly check so it will be interesting to keep an eye on it through imagery from Capella from time to time.

K-300P “Bastion-P” basic information

  • Anti-surface mobile coastal defence system
  • Consists of four TELs, each with two P-800 Oniks missiles, two Monolit-B mobile coastal surveillance radar vehicles, up to four loader vehicles, command and support vehicles.
  • Monolit-B has an approx range of 250 km in active mode, 240 km in passive mode
  • Can track up to 50 targets in passive mode, 30 in active
  • P-800: 6.9m in length; can cruise up to 2700 km/h at altitude; range between 120 km and 300 km depending on flight profile used; High cruise 46,000 ft, Low cruise 22 ft; 200 kg warhead
  • Command vehicle crew: 5
  • TEL crew: 3

Further information on Matua Island

The island itself is steeped in history, particularly for World War 2. All the trenches shown in the imagery are from that era. There’s a whole network of Japanese tunnels and bunkers located throughout the island; and reports that it was a potential test area for their nuclear weapons program that was being carried out at the end of the war.

A Zvezda video from 2017 on YouTube is well worth a watch – although it is obviously in Russian.

There’s also plenty of blogs and articles online that describe some of the research trips that have taken place there. To list a few:

https://zizuhotel.ru/en/bangkok/sekrety-matua-chto-skryvayut-nedra-kurilskogo-ostrova-yaponskuyu-krepost/



Murmansk-BN HF EW Complex

Murmansk-BN of the 475th Independent EW Centre near Sevastopol

Brief Murmansk-BN overview

Murmansk-BN has been operationally active from at least 2014 when the 475th Independent EW Centre of the Russian navy set up a complex in the Crimea south of Sevastopol. The system has a primary role of eliminating, or trying to eliminate, High Frequency (HF) broadcasts from NATO forces – in particular the HF Global Communications System of the United States (HFGCS).

HFGCS operates on well known HF frequencies with regular broadcasts of Emergency Action Messages (EAM’s) and other operational messages, phone patches etc. as required. To this date though, I am unaware of any reports that HFGCS has been interfered with by jamming. This in itself isn’t surprising. HF is a difficult thing to jam due to the very nature of using the ionosphere to carry the broadcasts. Throw in multiple frequencies in use at the same time, the same message being broadcast on numerous occasions, propagation and all other things related to HF reception means the message is likely to get through regardless of the attempts made to jam.

The Murmansk-BN complex is a fully mobile system and comprises of groups of up to four extendable antenna masts – two of which each on a dedicated Kamaz or Ural truck, which then tows a further antenna on a trailer. The masts extend to 32 metres in height. Each full Murmansk-BN complex normally has four of these antenna groups, making 16 antennas in total.

Further to that there are numerous support vehicles including a Kamaz 6350 Command vehicle and a Kamaz 6350 generator vehicle per four antenna group. Other vehicles include fuel bowsers and troop transport. Not always four antennas are used per group.

Murmansk-BN is in operation with units of both the Russian army and the navy – for the army with the 15th EW brigade in Tambov, 16th EW Brigade in Kursk, 18th EW Brigade in Yekaterinburg and 19th EW Brigade in Rassvet – for the navy with 186th Independent EW Centre of the Northern Fleet in Severomorsk, the 471st and 474th Independent EW Centres of the Pacific Fleet in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and Shtykovo respectively, the previously mentioned 475th Independent EW Centre of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and the 841st Independent EW Centre of the Baltic Fleet in Yantarnyy.

It is highly likely that the 17th EW Brigade at Khabarovsk also has Murmansk-BN in operation but a this time I haven’t been able to locate any of the systems.

Screen grab from one of the Murmansk-BN videos showing an Icom IC- R8500 in use as the main receiver in each command vehicle
AOR 500 in a R330ZH Zhitel – image credited to
twower.livejournal.com

One aspect about the system is its use of analogue receivers rather than Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology – Icom IC-R8500 receivers have been noted in all the video footage available so far. This isn’t unusual for Russian EW systems – the AOR 5000 receiver is used in R330ZH Zhitel which is a mobile system primarily used in the jamming of satellite and cellular phone communication systems operated in the 100 to 2,000 MHz range. The AOR 5000 has multiple versions available, one of which has the cellular bands (824 to 849 MHz and 869 to 894 MHz) unblocked. Zhitel was used in the Crimean conflict with the high likelihood that the AOR 5000 was used to jam or intercept mobile phone communications. Recent reports have shown that Zhitel is still in use in the occupied Luhansk region.

I use an R8500 myself and it is an excellent receiver. I normally use it in conjunction with my SDR’s that provide me with a wider view of the HF bands so that I can search out signals. From the videos available online, the Russian military don’t do this but instead slow scan manually through the bands or scroll through frequencies saved to the receivers memory bank.

The receiver is linked to a PC using software that shows a visual spectrum taken from the audio output from the R8500, but this is limited to the mode in use. Video footage shows the likely use of AM mode to give as wide a visual spectrum as possible but this would be limited to the R8500’s 12 kHz maximum bandwidth. More on the software later.

The slow scan/memory scan method is not the best and would likely mean that any interception would be caught mid-way through a message. It is also time consuming. I am highly surprised there isn’t some sort of auto-scan software included. For instance I personally use df8ry’s CSVUserListBrowser to control not only my R8500 but most of my SDR’s. This can scan through stored frequencies on the Icom at a slow 1 second pace, but its better than sitting there turning a knob continuously for hours.

As the Icom is a receiver only, it needs to be linked to a transceiver using its CI-V remote jack point that then sends out the jamming signal – whether this then means another Icom transceiver is located within the command vehicle is unknown as, whilst confirmed from commentary and interviews with Russian personnel in the videos I found, there is no visual confirmation of what is used as the transmitter.

Each antenna group can operate individually or as multiples. Reports also state that the complexes can be integrated into the Russian EW command and control system.

The software

The software in use cannot be identified. It appears to operate like an automatic signals classifier, such as go2MONITOR by Procitec, but it is hard to assess whether it has this capability. It would be unusual not to have a classification capability, even if it meant manual selection of a signal.

There are a number of different screens, some tabulated, that control different functions, or provide different data.

One screen shows spectrum information split into four panels. The top panel shows the selected frequency, and what looks like audio taken from the Icom in AM-Wide mode – this differs from cuts to the Icom itself which shows it is in AM mode. If in AM-Wide it would mean the maximum audio spectrum available would be 12 kHz as this is all that the Icom can manage in this mode below 30 MHz, whilst AM would only produce a 5.5 kHz wide spectrum. However, using either of these modes would make it possible to visually obtain a signal from this.

What is interesting here though is that in the video, the top panel appears to show a bandwidth spread of 30 kHz with an area of 6 kHz in a lighter colour, possibly depicting the true area that a signal can be classified or monitored. 30 kHz is not a selectable bandwidth for the R8500 in any mode, with the maximum possible being 15 kHz above 30 MHz in WFM mode. Also of note is the noise floor indication which appears to be between -40dB and -50dB.

It could well be that this panel does not actually show a signal from the Icom, but could be the panel that shows the transmitter that produces the jamming signal.

The next two panels appear to show the signal with sensitivity information from the incoming audio. The final panel is unknown as it is not shown in any video close-up.

Another screen shows interface information to the bottom left. This has a number of tabs that control some the external elements that assist in the suppression of a signal. Connection status is shown by a green or red button.

Firstly, one tab shows the connection to a Protek KS-100M navigation device which is a GPS unit. This is connected to an antenna mounted to the top of the command vehicle and provides an accurate position for probable signal reception direction finding/triangulation purposes when connected to the other command vehicles KS-100M’s.

The KS-100M is also found in the Zhitel system as shown here in the far right panel. It is used for Direction Finding purposes in both systems – image credited to
twower.livejournal.com

To the left of the KS-100 tab are two unknown connections marked as ГТ-11and ГТ-11.1 (GT-11 and GT-11.1). ГТ in the Russian military is normally an abbreviation for rehepatop which translate to generator. In another part of one of the videos it shows the ГТ-11.1 title again, this time with four green boxes, each with what appears to be a tick box. Two of these appear to be connected as there is a joining line between them.

The final tab is unknown but marked as ГТ-205-ОПМ (GT-205-OPM) which if using the standard abbreviation format would also be related to a generator. However, the generator shown in the video appears to be named as an AD-100-T400-1R. Alternatively, you could break down the OPM part into two which would give supply (OP)/ engine (M).

What doesn’t quite tie up is that each four antenna group only has one generator, so does this section actually have something to do with the four antennas themselves and whether they have power going to them?

Above the four tabs is a box that is titled Information about current IRI. Below this is information on the signal being suppressed: Frequency – 9 961 02 kHz Type of target – unclassified Bandwidth – 3.36 kHz Duration – 16 msec Strength – 16 dB Bearing – 179 7 (1) – 0

This box is likely associated with the KS-100M tab.

The large window to the right shows what I thought at first was historic signal information in the selected bandwidth. However, looking closer I wonder if this is the case as the “signals” are too regular – they are evenly spaced. In other shots there are up to 20 signals shown. My thoughts are that these are connected to the KS-100M and are signal strengths of GLONASS GPS satellites. But again, without clearer screenshots or a confirmed ID on the software in use, this can only be guessed at.

There are numerous other tabs and screens available, but these are unreadable in the videos found.

Locations

The various units I have listed above. The sites used so far, despite Murmansk-BN being fully mobile, have been very close to the units home base. Despite the area required for a full complex deployment being large, they can be difficult to spot, but once you know the locations used – or the area – then it makes checking on them relatively easy.

The 15th EW Brigade at Tambov has not been observed on Google Earth (GE) as deployed as yet but the vehicles can be seen at their HQ at 52.666385N 41.537552E

Latest 15th EW Brigade site imagery near Tambov. Dated 13/11/18 and is the first time the Murmansk-BN was observed here.

The 15th EW HQ is situated in a large area of military ranges with plenty of surrounding free land available. It is presumed that this area will be used when setting up the complex. There is also an area to the NW that previously contained numerous antennas, but is now disused.

The 16th EW Brigade at Kursk uses a military training group for its deployment site. Only two antenna groups have been observed since first deployment in April 2015.

Latest 16th EW Brigade site imagery near Kursk at 51.713194N,
36.290736E. Dated 3/9/19

The 18th EW Brigade at Yekaterinburg is a very active unit with just two Murmansk-BN antenna groups in use at any one time according to GE imagery. Moreover, it seems to be a unit that likes to train in setting up the complex as it is quite often observed in different states. The Murmansk-Bn is spread over two sites – a permanent one (site one below) and a secondary site located in a field about 1.6km away (site two). In some imagery of site two only one antenna is up in two “groups” and quite often the site is empty.

The continuous erecting and disassembling of the complex’s could hint at the unit being involved in training. As shown in the image below it also tends to use truck mounted antennas at site two. There are no trailer mounted antennas visible, whilst they are in use at site one. However, the fact that there are six truck mounted here points to the 18th EW having a full compliment of Murmansk-BN equipment, despite only using two groups at the same time.

Murmansk-BN equipment of 18 EW Brigade at site two in a stored state

The 18th EW was also used in one of the videos. Comparing the video to GE imagery I was able to identify various features that confirmed that site two was used for the filming.

Site two confirmed as used in the Pravda.ru video

The 19th EW Brigade at Rassvet, near Rostov-on-Don, has had Murmansk-BN since at least 19/6/2016 when equipment first appeared in GE imagery at the HQ. Since then it would appear that it has not been deployed as the vehicles have stayed in a parked up state in all imagery from that date. The number of vehicles indicates only two groups have been allocated to the Brigade so far.

19th EW Brigade HQ in latest imagery dated 15/2/19

On the Russian navy side of things, the 186th Independent EW centre is based near Taybola at 68.515306N 33.290056E on the old airfield for the town. Taybola used to be a Soviet R-14 (SS-5 ‘Skean’) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) base with at least two silo complexes, a rail head, and the airfield.

The latest imagery on GE has just two Murmansk-BN groups set up at the northern end of the runway and old dispersal, but older imagery has a further group half way down the runway to the south.

GE imagery dated 18/8/17 showing the three locations of Murmansk-BN groups. the 186th has had the Murmansk-BN capability since at least 20/8/15 according to GE

The 471st Independent EW centre at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, has a full complement of four Murmansk-BN antenna groups though it has had differing numbers in use since the system first arrived from at least 15/8/15. The latest imagery on GE below, dated from 3/11/18, shows just about a full complex in use. The NW group has one antenna missing.

471st Independent EW centre situated at 53.053583N 158.828178E

The 474th Independent EW Centre at Shtykovo, is also sited at a disused airfield. It has had three antenna groups in place at least once, but the latest GE imagery has just two in use.

The actual location of the 474th HQ is unknown and there no immediately close active military bases. There are numerous bases at a distance away, with a potential SIGINT site 12km to the SW. Analysis of these don’t provide any other Murmansk-BN vehicles.

The 475th Independent EW Centre is probably the most well known of the Murmansk-BN deployments. It is located to the south of Sevastopol in the Crimea at a coastal base and has been widely exposed on social media and articles since it became active. First shown in GE imagery dated 15/11/14 with one group, it has expanded to a full four group complex.

The 475th complex shown here, dated 26/8/18, with just the NW group active

It was news about the deployment of Murmansk-BN to the 841st Independent EW Centre at Yantarnyy in the Kaliningrad Oblast that drew my attention to the system. It is known that the 841st has a full compliment of four antenna groups but it is unusual to see all deployed. The image below, dated 11/9/17 is one of those times that it is fully active.

It is usually the northern site that is active when the 841st deploy. This is situated at 54.832506N 19.958467E. The “town” of Okunevo is actually a comms site.

The news I mention was reference the “new” deployment of Murmansk-BN to the Kaliningrad region, yet what is strange is that from GE analysis it is obvious the system has been in use there since at least 11/4/16 – so why this sudden hype? My only thought is that there was a major NATO exercise on in the region at the time which included USAF B-52’s carrying out Global Power missions from the US to Europe.

Was this news a counter to the US stating that Russian forces could interfere with their operations?

From all accounts, and from reported loggings of HFGCS messages since the Murmansk-BN system has been available for use, there has been zero suppression of any HFGCS frequencies that I’m aware of.

This then, with the fact that most units have not fully deployed their systems, makes me wonder whether Murmansk-BN is not quite so good as expected and claimed.

Here are the videos used for analysis:

This is the longer of the two videos and actually contains the second one.

https://www.yacoline.com/video/168091/

Second, shorter video showing the 186th Independent EW centre