Brief Murmansk-BN overview
Murmansk-BN has been operationally active from at least 2014 when the 475th Independent EW Centre of the Russian navy set up a complex in the Crimea south of Sevastopol. The system has a primary role of eliminating, or trying to eliminate, High Frequency (HF) broadcasts from NATO forces – in particular the HF Global Communications System of the United States (HFGCS).
HFGCS operates on well known HF frequencies with regular broadcasts of Emergency Action Messages (EAM’s) and other operational messages, phone patches etc. as required. To this date though, I am unaware of any reports that HFGCS has been interfered with by jamming. This in itself isn’t surprising. HF is a difficult thing to jam due to the very nature of using the ionosphere to carry the broadcasts. Throw in multiple frequencies in use at the same time, the same message being broadcast on numerous occasions, propagation and all other things related to HF reception means the message is likely to get through regardless of the attempts made to jam.
The Murmansk-BN complex is a fully mobile system and comprises of groups of up to four extendable antenna masts – two of which each on a dedicated Kamaz or Ural truck, which then tows a further antenna on a trailer. The masts extend to 32 metres in height. Each full Murmansk-BN complex normally has four of these antenna groups, making 16 antennas in total.
Further to that there are numerous support vehicles including a Kamaz 6350 Command vehicle and a Kamaz 6350 generator vehicle per four antenna group. Other vehicles include fuel bowsers and troop transport. Not always four antennas are used per group.
Murmansk-BN is in operation with units of both the Russian army and the navy – for the army with the 15th EW brigade in Tambov, 16th EW Brigade in Kursk, 18th EW Brigade in Yekaterinburg and 19th EW Brigade in Rassvet – for the navy with 186th Independent EW Centre of the Northern Fleet in Severomorsk, the 471st and 474th Independent EW Centres of the Pacific Fleet in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and Shtykovo respectively, the previously mentioned 475th Independent EW Centre of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and the 841st Independent EW Centre of the Baltic Fleet in Yantarnyy.
It is highly likely that the 17th EW Brigade at Khabarovsk also has Murmansk-BN in operation but a this time I haven’t been able to locate any of the systems.
One aspect about the system is its use of analogue receivers rather than Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology – Icom IC-R8500 receivers have been noted in all the video footage available so far. This isn’t unusual for Russian EW systems – the AOR 5000 receiver is used in R330ZH Zhitel which is a mobile system primarily used in the jamming of satellite and cellular phone communication systems operated in the 100 to 2,000 MHz range. The AOR 5000 has multiple versions available, one of which has the cellular bands (824 to 849 MHz and 869 to 894 MHz) unblocked. Zhitel was used in the Crimean conflict with the high likelihood that the AOR 5000 was used to jam or intercept mobile phone communications. Recent reports have shown that Zhitel is still in use in the occupied Luhansk region.
I use an R8500 myself and it is an excellent receiver. I normally use it in conjunction with my SDR’s that provide me with a wider view of the HF bands so that I can search out signals. From the videos available online, the Russian military don’t do this but instead slow scan manually through the bands or scroll through frequencies saved to the receivers memory bank.
The receiver is linked to a PC using software that shows a visual spectrum taken from the audio output from the R8500, but this is limited to the mode in use. Video footage shows the likely use of AM mode to give as wide a visual spectrum as possible but this would be limited to the R8500’s 12 kHz maximum bandwidth. More on the software later.
The slow scan/memory scan method is not the best and would likely mean that any interception would be caught mid-way through a message. It is also time consuming. I am highly surprised there isn’t some sort of auto-scan software included. For instance I personally use df8ry’s CSVUserListBrowser to control not only my R8500 but most of my SDR’s. This can scan through stored frequencies on the Icom at a slow 1 second pace, but its better than sitting there turning a knob continuously for hours.
As the Icom is a receiver only, it needs to be linked to a transceiver using its CI-V remote jack point that then sends out the jamming signal – whether this then means another Icom transceiver is located within the command vehicle is unknown as, whilst confirmed from commentary and interviews with Russian personnel in the videos I found, there is no visual confirmation of what is used as the transmitter.
Each antenna group can operate individually or as multiples. Reports also state that the complexes can be integrated into the Russian EW command and control system.
The software in use cannot be identified. It appears to operate like an automatic signals classifier, such as go2MONITOR by Procitec, but it is hard to assess whether it has this capability. It would be unusual not to have a classification capability, even if it meant manual selection of a signal.
There are a number of different screens, some tabulated, that control different functions, or provide different data.
One screen shows spectrum information split into four panels. The top panel shows the selected frequency, and what looks like audio taken from the Icom in AM-Wide mode – this differs from cuts to the Icom itself which shows it is in AM mode. If in AM-Wide it would mean the maximum audio spectrum available would be 12 kHz as this is all that the Icom can manage in this mode below 30 MHz, whilst AM would only produce a 5.5 kHz wide spectrum. However, using either of these modes would make it possible to visually obtain a signal from this.
What is interesting here though is that in the video, the top panel appears to show a bandwidth spread of 30 kHz with an area of 6 kHz in a lighter colour, possibly depicting the true area that a signal can be classified or monitored. 30 kHz is not a selectable bandwidth for the R8500 in any mode, with the maximum possible being 15 kHz above 30 MHz in WFM mode. Also of note is the noise floor indication which appears to be between -40dB and -50dB.
It could well be that this panel does not actually show a signal from the Icom, but could be the panel that shows the transmitter that produces the jamming signal.
The next two panels appear to show the signal with sensitivity information from the incoming audio. The final panel is unknown as it is not shown in any video close-up.
Another screen shows interface information to the bottom left. This has a number of tabs that control some the external elements that assist in the suppression of a signal. Connection status is shown by a green or red button.
Firstly, one tab shows the connection to a Protek KS-100M navigation device which is a GPS unit. This is connected to an antenna mounted to the top of the command vehicle and provides an accurate position for probable signal reception direction finding/triangulation purposes when connected to the other command vehicles KS-100M’s.
To the left of the KS-100 tab are two unknown connections marked as ГТ-11and ГТ-11.1 (GT-11 and GT-11.1). ГТ in the Russian military is normally an abbreviation for rehepatop which translate to generator. In another part of one of the videos it shows the ГТ-11.1 title again, this time with four green boxes, each with what appears to be a tick box. Two of these appear to be connected as there is a joining line between them.
The final tab is unknown but marked as ГТ-205-ОПМ (GT-205-OPM) which if using the standard abbreviation format would also be related to a generator. However, the generator shown in the video appears to be named as an AD-100-T400-1R. Alternatively, you could break down the OPM part into two which would give supply (OP)/ engine (M).
What doesn’t quite tie up is that each four antenna group only has one generator, so does this section actually have something to do with the four antennas themselves and whether they have power going to them?
Above the four tabs is a box that is titled Information about current IRI. Below this is information on the signal being suppressed: Frequency – 9 961 02 kHz Type of target – unclassified Bandwidth – 3.36 kHz Duration – 16 msec Strength – 16 dB Bearing – 179 7 (1) – 0
This box is likely associated with the KS-100M tab.
The large window to the right shows what I thought at first was historic signal information in the selected bandwidth. However, looking closer I wonder if this is the case as the “signals” are too regular – they are evenly spaced. In other shots there are up to 20 signals shown. My thoughts are that these are connected to the KS-100M and are signal strengths of GLONASS GPS satellites. But again, without clearer screenshots or a confirmed ID on the software in use, this can only be guessed at.
There are numerous other tabs and screens available, but these are unreadable in the videos found.
The various units I have listed above. The sites used so far, despite Murmansk-BN being fully mobile, have been very close to the units home base. Despite the area required for a full complex deployment being large, they can be difficult to spot, but once you know the locations used – or the area – then it makes checking on them relatively easy.
The 15th EW Brigade at Tambov has not been observed on Google Earth (GE) as deployed as yet but the vehicles can be seen at their HQ at 52.666385N 41.537552E
The 15th EW HQ is situated in a large area of military ranges with plenty of surrounding free land available. It is presumed that this area will be used when setting up the complex. There is also an area to the NW that previously contained numerous antennas, but is now disused.
The 16th EW Brigade at Kursk uses a military training group for its deployment site. Only two antenna groups have been observed since first deployment in April 2015.
The 18th EW Brigade at Yekaterinburg is a very active unit with just two Murmansk-BN antenna groups in use at any one time according to GE imagery. Moreover, it seems to be a unit that likes to train in setting up the complex as it is quite often observed in different states. The Murmansk-Bn is spread over two sites – a permanent one (site one below) and a secondary site located in a field about 1.6km away (site two). In some imagery of site two only one antenna is up in two “groups” and quite often the site is empty.
The continuous erecting and disassembling of the complex’s could hint at the unit being involved in training. As shown in the image below it also tends to use truck mounted antennas at site two. There are no trailer mounted antennas visible, whilst they are in use at site one. However, the fact that there are six truck mounted here points to the 18th EW having a full compliment of Murmansk-BN equipment, despite only using two groups at the same time.
The 18th EW was also used in one of the videos. Comparing the video to GE imagery I was able to identify various features that confirmed that site two was used for the filming.
The 19th EW Brigade at Rassvet, near Rostov-on-Don, has had Murmansk-BN since at least 19/6/2016 when equipment first appeared in GE imagery at the HQ. Since then it would appear that it has not been deployed as the vehicles have stayed in a parked up state in all imagery from that date. The number of vehicles indicates only two groups have been allocated to the Brigade so far.
On the Russian navy side of things, the 186th Independent EW centre is based near Taybola at 68.515306N 33.290056E on the old airfield for the town. Taybola used to be a Soviet R-14 (SS-5 ‘Skean’) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) base with at least two silo complexes, a rail head, and the airfield.
The latest imagery on GE has just two Murmansk-BN groups set up at the northern end of the runway and old dispersal, but older imagery has a further group half way down the runway to the south.
The 471st Independent EW centre at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, has a full complement of four Murmansk-BN antenna groups though it has had differing numbers in use since the system first arrived from at least 15/8/15. The latest imagery on GE below, dated from 3/11/18, shows just about a full complex in use. The NW group has one antenna missing.
The 474th Independent EW Centre at Shtykovo, is also sited at a disused airfield. It has had three antenna groups in place at least once, but the latest GE imagery has just two in use.
The actual location of the 474th HQ is unknown and there no immediately close active military bases. There are numerous bases at a distance away, with a potential SIGINT site 12km to the SW. Analysis of these don’t provide any other Murmansk-BN vehicles.
The 475th Independent EW Centre is probably the most well known of the Murmansk-BN deployments. It is located to the south of Sevastopol in the Crimea at a coastal base and has been widely exposed on social media and articles since it became active. First shown in GE imagery dated 15/11/14 with one group, it has expanded to a full four group complex.
It was news about the deployment of Murmansk-BN to the 841st Independent EW Centre at Yantarnyy in the Kaliningrad Oblast that drew my attention to the system. It is known that the 841st has a full compliment of four antenna groups but it is unusual to see all deployed. The image below, dated 11/9/17 is one of those times that it is fully active.
The news I mention was reference the “new” deployment of Murmansk-BN to the Kaliningrad region, yet what is strange is that from GE analysis it is obvious the system has been in use there since at least 11/4/16 – so why this sudden hype? My only thought is that there was a major NATO exercise on in the region at the time which included USAF B-52’s carrying out Global Power missions from the US to Europe.
Was this news a counter to the US stating that Russian forces could interfere with their operations?
From all accounts, and from reported loggings of HFGCS messages since the Murmansk-BN system has been available for use, there has been zero suppression of any HFGCS frequencies that I’m aware of.
This then, with the fact that most units have not fully deployed their systems, makes me wonder whether Murmansk-BN is not quite so good as expected and claimed.
Here are the videos used for analysis:
This is the longer of the two videos and actually contains the second one.
Second, shorter video showing the 186th Independent EW centre
Do they jam from these same units or are the rx and tx sites separate? Can’t see them being very effective when they jam their own rx. In past hf jamming efforts of western bcasts to eastern Europe and Russia, jamming specialists listened to the signal to be jammed from remote sites and gauged the effectiveness of the jamming signal and adjusted the jamming to suit.
From my analysis it looks like they use the same complex to suppress as that which they use to monitor. They could well use one group as a RX and another as a suppressor within the complex.
There isn’t an obvious communication link to another unit or site – but that really doesn’t mean there isn’t. There could be some sort of data linking involved.
However, i’m sure you’ve watched the videos and you’ll see that the group vehicle commander carries out the instructions, and is fed back information by the operator.
Of course, it could all be for show.
Hello, I saw this video and it seems to me very unlikely that the Russian forces use commercial receivers like icom or Aor in order to intercept hf communications, same story for the software used.
I think that they hidden all sensitive equipments and software prior this public video was arranged.
This is the correct Icom equipment. It has been observed in many different units, and the AOR’s have been spotted in different Zhitel units.
You can see that the radios are mounted to the desks in custom made holders.
The software is also correct
I agree that they use “western” commercial off the shelf rf gear in a lot of instances for the front end stuff, and I don’t really know why as Russia has a thriving domestic sdr base as far as mil/gov and open market sdr makers goes. A fear of having their sdr radio hacked might be part of the reasoning, hard to remotely hack a hardware radio.
Perhaps they keep their good china in the cabinet for special occasions and use the cheap dishes for company.
An interesting jamming method I heard Russia used was to put a wobbling carrier on the IF freq of the suspect listener radio (in this case an entire city usually), had to use huge power levels and be close to the intended target to jam successfully so doubt they will be using that method to jam hfgcs. This method would likely work on nearby cell/smartphones however, as well as anything else that ran a 455KHz IF.
Thanks, very intresting
I may have heard this thing in action the other day. A few days ago I had a rx staring at hfgcs and while ssb voice traffic was passing, something fired up that took out the voice comms on that channel. It was like a very powerful carrier sweeping wildly and quickly over the passband, almost like screaming but a carrier not a voice. Couldn’t understand anything underneath it while it was in operation, then like that it was gone, maybe 10, 20 seconds or a biut longer. Never heard anything like it before. I need to start recording stuff on a time loop.
Thanks for the info. Which of the HFGCS freqs was it?
Been listening to hfgcs since 89 so am familiar with its day to day activities a bit. That said, should have written down the time of the event so as to look at propagation possibilities. If the band was long it certainly could have been them emitting from their home territory, or maybe they have have some units closer to the US, as in south America or Cuba. Also wonder who they’ve sold these to?
They’re only operational in Russia at the moment (if you include Crimea in that) and only by Russian Mil
I wondered if it was an unintentional signal, or perhaps a joker rolling his vfo back and forth over the channel, but those morons likely can’t control their tuning range as tight as this thing did, It never broke about 2.9kHz, wich made me take notice as most jokers and sweeping signals, as are commonly found on hf, hit one side of the passband and exit the other on their way up or down the bands, this thing stayed right on the channel and shut it down, at least for me.
I imagine a very fast tracking auto notch filter could eliminate the varying carrier but dunno how that would also effect desired comms. The same rig had another rx tuned to 11232, Trenton Mil just up the band from triple one, and not a peep was heard of this thing or any sweepers/ionosondes.
From the vids it looks like they’re using log periodics or a curtain array of some type via a balanced open wire feed of the array with coax to the mast, and I presume they aim the logs at the desired azimuth. Also they seem to be watching NATO FSK (maybe that was a T600 FSK sig?) and possibly S4285 per the longer vid, so not only are they looking at HFGCS but also NATO naval sigs, wich makes sense.
I wonder if they have several jamming modes, say where one is to simply make a channel useless ie brute force method, another to surreptitiously add a bit here or there to a FSK or PSK signal, thus compromising accurate reception, or perhaps sending out of phase sigs in an effort to cancel out or degrade a sig at a specific reception site? Simply sending a delayed copy of the original, or perhaps elongated tone duration might be enough to smear some bits at a enemy rx site. Some mil PSK sigs are coded to endure at least one interfering tone, multipath, and etc, such as S4285, other PSK modes fall apart completely when an single interferer is present, such as in the case of HFDL. Just some musings.
shows a V/UHF circularly polarised component of the jamming system, an array of helicals likely designed to perform best in the USN/USAF/NATO V/UHF mil sat frequency range.
Yes – this video is very interesting. Lots of propaganda. Firstly the “US sailor” is almost certainly made up. The tweet is not in a language of an American – “pride of our fleet” is more of a Russian phrase!
I have extreme doubts on the whole incident.
Lots of other gear in there that fulfills many a task – the have certainly tried to cover all aspects of communication.
This is something the West had pretty much dropped and are in a race now to catch up on. Too much reliance on SATCOM, effectively removing HF for long distance comms, has put the US and NATO in a position that they weren’t expecting and are now trying to fix, with a huge expansion in HF in particular.
The realisation that SATCOM would almost certainly be wiped out in a nuclear strike, whilst HF would survive, has suddenly hit home.
Russia though, still heavily relies on HF and so have been able to think about what would be used as a method of jamming their own comms by NATO and have developed them first.
How effective they are though is still debatable.
In the videos they are using Stanag 4285 as one example of reception rather than jamming. They also use a RTTY broadcast from Deutscher Wetterdienst.
I would say they do point the groups in the general direction of where they want to jam, but this seems a rather stupid “hit or miss” idea:
1 – They don’t have a clue where the target would be coming from/operating in
2 – It takes a very long time to set up – take down – and adjust the direction.
I suspect this is why they have four antenna groups in a complex so that they can cover an arc, but it isn’t the most efficient method.
I was thinking the same thing about the alleged US sailor from the alleged destroyer taken out by ew weapons, heard about that months ago. The phrasing and word order isn’t something an American would use, so likely a complete fabrication paraphrased into something a Russian would better understand.
On the S4285 and FSK in the vid, I suppose they were just giving the press a quick example of how they monitor sigs. I doubt the German Weather Service is high on the jamming target list.
On a like note, I wonder if the complex delivered to Crimea, or on the UA border, is in use to help in the amateur radio war going on between UA and RU.
Oh yes, only demos, they wouldn’t be jamming the weather service. The S4285 in theory could be a target but as I doubt they’d even know what was being sent I don’t think they’d use it on that.
I suspect it is primarily aimed at voice comms
I heard a similar if not identical jamming sig on 11175 a few days ago, and followed it as it moved down the band. It settled on 11170, a frequency used by SoH, Sound of Hope, a Taiwanese outlet aimed at mainland China, China uses jammers of various types to thwart the effort. I was unable to hear SoH under the jamming at the time, even so I might have been spoofed in my previous report. Lol.
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